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Abstract
Service replication distributes an application over many processes for tolerating faults, attacks, and
misbehavior among a subset of the processes. With the recent interest in blockchain technologies,
distributed execution of one logical application has become a prominent topic. The established state-
machine replication paradigm inherently requires the application to be deterministic. This paper
distinguishes three models for dealing with non-determinism in replicated services, where some pro-
cesses are subject to faults and arbitrary behavior (so-called Byzantine faults): first, the modular case
that does not require any changes to the potentially non-deterministic application (and neither access
to its internal data); second, master-slave solutions, where ties are broken by a leader and the other
processes validate the choices of the leader; and finally, applications that use cryptography and secret
keys. Cryptographic operations and secrets must be treated specially because they require strong
randomness to satisfy their goals.
The paper also introduces two new protocols. First, Protocol Sieve uses the modular approach and
filters out non-deterministic operations in an application. It ensures that all correct processes produce
the same outputs and that their internal states do not diverge. A second protocol, called Mastercrypt,
implements cryptographically secure randomness generation with a verifiable random function and
is appropriate for most situations in which cryptographic secrets are involved. All protocols are de-
scribed in a generic way and do not assume a particular implementation of the underlying consensus
primitive.
1 Introduction
State-machine replication is an established way to enhance the resilience of a client-server applica-
tion [36]. It works by executing the service on multiple independent components that will not exhibit
correlated failures. We consider the approach of Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT), where a group of
processes connected only by an unreliable network executes an application [34]. The processes use a
protocol for consensus or atomic broadcast to agree on a common sequence of operations to execute.
If all processes start from the same initial state, if all operations that modify the state are deterministic,
and if all processes execute the same sequence of operations, then the states of the correct processes
will remain the same. (This is also called active replication [14].) A client executes an operation on the
service by sending the operation to all processes; it obtains the correct outcome based on comparing the
responses that it receives, for example, by a relative majority among the answers or from a sufficiently
large set of equal responses. Tolerating Byzantine faults means that the clients obtain correct outputs as
long as a qualified majority of the processes is correct, even if the faulty processes behave in arbitrary
and adversarial ways.
Traditionally state-machine replication requires the application to be deterministic. But many ap-
plications contain implicit or explicit non-determinism: in multi-threaded applications, the scheduler
∗A preliminary version of this work has been presented at OPODIS 2016 (Madrid, Spain) and an extended abstract appears
in the proceedings.
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may influence the execution, input/output operations might yield different results across the processes,
probabilistic algorithms may access a random-number generator, and some cryptographic operations are
inherently not deterministic.
Recently BFT replication has gained prominence because it may implement distributed consensus for
building blockchains [1, 16, 40, 5]. A blockchain provides a distributed, append-only ledger with cryp-
tographic verifiability and is governed by decentralized control. It can be used to record events, trades,
or transactions immutably and permanently and forms the basis for cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin
or Ripple, or for running “smart contracts,” as in Ethereum. With the focus on active replication, this
work aims at permissioned blockchains, which run among known entities [39]. In contrast, permission-
less blockchains (including Ethereum) do not rely on identities and use other approaches for reaching
consensus, such as proof-of-work protocols. For practical use of blockchains, ensuring deterministic
operations is crucial since even the smallest divergence among the outputs of different participants lets
the blockchain diverge (or “fork”).
This work presents a general treatment of non-determinism in the context of BFT replication and
introduces a distinction among different models to tackle the problem of non-determinism. For example,
applications involving cryptography and secret encryption keys should be treated differently from those
that access randomness for other goals. We also distinguish whether the replication mechanism has
access to the application’s source code and may modify it.
We also introduce two novel protocols. The first, called Sieve, replicates non-deterministic programs
using in a modular way, where we treat the application as a black box and cannot change it. We target
workloads that are usually deterministic, but which may occasionally yield diverging outputs. The pro-
tocol initially executes all operations speculatively and then compares the outputs across the processes.
If the protocol detects a minor divergence among a small number of processes, then we sieve out the
diverging values; if a divergence among too many processes occurs, we sieve out the operation from se-
quence. Furthermore, the protocol can use any underlying consensus primitive to agree on an ordering.
The second new protocol, Mastercrypt, provides master-slave replication with cryptographic security
from verifiable random functions. It addresses situations that require strong, cryptographically secure
randomness, but where the faulty processes may leak their secrets.
1.1 Contributions
We introduce three different models and discuss corresponding protocols for replicating non-determin-
istic applications.
Modular: When the application itself is fixed and cannot be changed, then we need modular replicated
execution. In practice this is often the case. We distinguish two approaches for integrating a
consensus protocol for ordering operations with the replicated execution of operations. One can
either use order-then-execute, where the operations are ordered first, executed independently, and
the results are communicated to the other processes through atomic broadcast. This involves only
deterministic steps and can be viewed as “agreement on the input.” Alternatively, with execute-
then-order, the processes execute all operations speculatively first and then “agree on the output”
(of the operation). In this case operations with diverging results may have to be rolled back.
We introduce Protocol Sieve that uses speculative execution and follows the execute-then-order ap-
proach. As described before, Sieve is intended for applications with occasional non-determinism.
It represents the first modular solution to replicating non-deterministic applications in a BFT sys-
tem.
Master-slave: In the master-slave model, one process is designated as the master or “leader,” makes
all non-deterministic choices that come up, and imposes these on the others which act as slaves
or “followers.” Because a faulty (Byzantine) master may misbehave, the slaves must be able to
validate the selections of the master before the operation can be executed as determined by the
master. The master-slave model is related to passive replication; it works for most applications
including probabilistic algorithms, but cannot be applied directly for cryptographic operations. As
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a further complication, this model requires that the developer has access to the internals of the
application and can modify it.
For the master-slave model we give a detailed description of the well-known replication protocol,
which has been used in earlier systems.
Cryptographically secure: Traditionally, randomized applications can be made deterministic by deriv-
ing pseudorandom bits from a secret seed, which is initially chosen truly randomly. Outsiders,
such as clients of the application, cannot distinguish this from an application that uses true ran-
domness. This approach does not work for BFT replication, where faulty processes might expose
and leak the seed. To solve this problem, we introduce a novel protocol for master-slave replica-
tion with cryptographic randomness, abbreviated Mastercrypt. It lets the master select random bits
with a verifiable random function. The protocol is aimed at applications that need strong, cryp-
tographically secure randomness; however it does not protect against a faulty master that leaks
the secret. We also review the established approach of threshold (public-key) cryptography, where
private keys are secret-shared among the processes and cryptographic operations are distributed in
a fault-tolerant way over the whole group.
The modular Protocol Sieve has been developed for running potentially non-deterministic smart con-
tracts as applications on top of a permissioned blockchain platform, built using BFT replication. An
implementation has been made available as open source in “Hyperledger fabric” 1, which is part of the
Linux Foundation’s Hyperledger Project. As of November 2016, the project has decided to adopt a dif-
ferent architecture 2; the platform has been redesigned to use a master-slave approach for addressing
non-deterministic execution.
1.2 Related work
The problem of ensuring deterministic operations for replicated services is well-known. When consider-
ing only crash faults, many authors have investigated methods for making services deterministic, espe-
cially for multi-threaded, high-performance services [2]. Practical systems routinely solve this problem
today using master-slave replication, where the master removes the ambiguity and sends deterministic
updates to the slaves. In recent research on this topic, for instance, Kapitza et al. [26] present an opti-
mistic solution for making multithreaded applications deterministic. Their solution requires a predictor
for non-deterministic choices and may invoke additional communication via the consensus module.
In the BFT model, most works consider only sequential execution of deterministic commands, in-
cluding PBFT [11] and UpRight [15]. BASE [12] and CBASE [28] address Byzantine faults and adopt
the master-slave model for handling non-determinism, focusing on being generic (BASE) and on achiev-
ing high throughput (CBASE), respectively. These systems involve changes to the application code and
sometimes also need preprocessing steps for operations.
Fault-tolerant execution on multi-core servers poses a new challenge, even for deterministic appli-
cations, because thread-level parallelism may introduce unpredictable differences between processes.
Eve [27] heuristically identifies groups of non-interfering operations and executes each group in paral-
lel. Afterwards it compares the outputs, may roll back operations that lead to diverging states, or could
transfer an agreed-on result state to diverging processes. Eve resembles Protocol Sieve in this sense, but
lacks modularity.
For the same domain of scalable services running on multi-cores, Rex [23] uses the master-slave
model, where the master executes the operations first and records its non-deterministic choices. The
slaves replay these operations and use a consensus primitive to agree on a consistent outcome. Rex only
tolerates crashes, but does not address the BFT model.
Fault-tolerant replication involving cryptographic secrets and distributed cryptography has been pi-
oneered by Reiter and Birman [35]. Many other works followed, especially protocols using threshold
cryptography; an early overview of solutions in this space was given by Cachin [4].
1https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric
2https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric/blob/master/proposals/r1/Next-Consensus-Architecture-Propo
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In current work Duan and Zhang [19] discuss how the master-slave approach can handle random-
ized operations in BFT replication, where execution is separated from agreement in order to protect the
privacy of the data and computation.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this paper starts with Section 2, containing background information and formal defini-
tions of broadcast, replication, and atomic broadcast (i.e., consensus). The following sections contain the
discussion and protocols for the three models: the modular solution (Section 3), the master-slave protocol
(Section 4), and replication methods for applications demanding cryptographic security (Section 5).
2 Definitions
2.1 System model
We consider a distributed system of processes that communicate with each other and provide a common
service in a fault-tolerant way. Using the paradigm of service replication [36], requests to the service
are broadcast among the processes, such that the processes execute all requests in the same order. The
clients accessing the service are not modeled here. We denote the set of processes by P and let n = |P|.
A process may be faulty, by crashing or by exhibiting Byzantine faults; the latter means they may deviate
arbitrarily from their specification. Non-faulty processes are called correct. Up to f processes may be
faulty and we assume that n > 3f . The setup is also called a Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) service
replication system or simply a BFT system.
We present protocols in a modular way using an event-based notation [6]. A process is specified
through its interface, containing the events that it exposes to other processes, and through a set of prop-
erties, which define its behavior. A process may react to a received event by doing computation and
triggering further events. The events of a process interface consist of input events, which the process re-
ceives from other processes, typically to invoke its services, and output events, through which the process
delivers information or signals a condition to another process.
Every two processes can send messages to each other using an authenticated point-to-point commu-
nication primitive. When a message arrives, the receiver learns also which process has sent the message.
The primitive guarantees message integrity, i.e., when a message m is received by a correct process with
indicated sender ps, and ps is correct, then ps previously sent m. Authenticated communication can be
implemented easily from an insecure communication channel by using a message-authentication code
(MAC) [31], a symmetric cryptographic primitive that relies on a secret key shared by every pair of
processes. These keys have been distributed by a trusted entity beforehand.
The system is partially synchronous [20] in the sense that there is no a priori bound on message
delays and the processes have no synchronized clocks, as in an asynchronous system. However, there
is a time (not known to the processes) after which the system is stable in the sense that message delays
and processing times are bounded. In other words, the system is eventually synchronous. This model
represents a broadly accepted network model and covers a wide range of real-world situations.
2.2 Broadcast and state-machine replication
Suppose n processes participate in a broadcast primitive. Every process may broadcast a request or
message m to the others. The implementation generates events to output the requests when they have
been agreed; we say that a request m is delivered through this. Atomic broadcast also solves the con-
sensus problem [24, 6]. We use a variant that delivers only messages satisfying a given external validity
condition [7].
Definition 1 (Byzantine atomic broadcast with external validity). A Byzantine atomic broadcast with
external validity (abv) is defined with the help of a validation predicate V () and in terms of these events:
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Input event: abv-broadcast(m): Broadcasts a message m to all processes.
Output event: abv-deliver(p,m): Delivers a message m broadcast by process p.
The deterministic predicate V () validates messages. It can be computed locally by every process.
It ensures that a correct process only delivers messages that satisfy V (). More precisely, V () must
guarantee that when two correct processes p and q have both delivered the same sequence of messages
up to some point, then p obtains V (m) = TRUE for any message m if and only if q also determines
that V (m) = TRUE.
With this validity mechanism, the broadcast satisfies:
Validity: If a correct process p broadcasts a message m, then p eventually delivers m.
External validity: When a correct process delivers some message m, then V (m) = TRUE.
No duplication: No correct process delivers the same message more than once.
Integrity: If some correct process delivers a message m with sender p and process p is correct, then m
was previously broadcast by p.
Agreement: If a message m is delivered by some correct process, then m is eventually delivered by
every correct process.
Total order: Let m1 and m2 be any two messages and suppose p and q are any two correct processes
that deliver m1 and m2. If p delivers m1 before m2, then q delivers m1 before m2.
In practice it may occur that not all processes agree in the above sense on the validity of a message.
For instance, some correct process may conclude V (m) = TRUE while others find that V (m) = FALSE.
For this case it is useful to reason with the following relaxation:
Weak external validity: When a correct process delivers some message m, then at least one correct
process has determined that V (m) = TRUE at some time between when m was broadcast and
when it was delivered.
Every protocol for Byzantine atomic broadcast with external validity of which we are aware either en-
sures this weaker notion or can easily be changed to satisfy it.
Atomic broadcast is the main tool to implement state-machine replication (SMR), which executes a
service on multiple processes for tolerating process faults. Throughout this work we assume that many
operation requests are generated concurrently by all processes; in other words, there is request contention.
A state machine consists of variables and operations that transform its state and may produce some
output. Traditionally, operations are deterministic and the outputs of the state machine are solely deter-
mined by the initial state and by the sequence of operations that it has executed.
The state machine functionality is defined by execute(), a function that takes a state s ∈ S , ini-
tially s0, and operation o ∈ O as input, and outputs a successor state s′ and a response or output value r:
execute(s, o) → (s′, r),
A replicated state machine can be characterized as in Definition 2. Basically, its interface presents
two events: first, an input event rsm-execute(operation) that a process uses to invoke the execution of
an operation o of the state machine; and second, an output event rsm-output(o, s, r), which is produced
by the state machine. The output indicates the operation has been executed and carries the resulting
state s and response r. We assume here that an operation o includes both the name of the operation to be
executed and any relevant parameters.
Definition 2. A replicated state machine (rsm) for a functionality execute() and initial state s0 is defined
by these events:
Input event: rsm-execute(o): Requests that the state machine executes the operation o.
Output event: rsm-output(o, s, r): Indicates that the state machine has executed an operation o, result-
ing in new state s, and producing response r.
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It also satisfies these properties:
Agreement: The sequences of executed operations and corresponding outputs are the same for all cor-
rect processes.
Correctness: When a correct process has executed a sequence of operations o1, . . . , ok, then the se-
quences of output states s1, . . . , sk and responses r1, . . . , rk satisfies for i = 1, . . . , k,
(si, ri) = execute(si−1, oi)
Termination: If a correct process executes a operation, then the operation eventually generates an out-
put.
The standard implementation of a replicated state machine relies on an atomic broadcast protocol to
disseminate the requests to all processes [36, 24]. Every process starts from the same initial state and
executes all operations in the order in which they are delivered. If all operations are deterministic the
states of the correct processes never diverge.
2.3 Leader election
Implementations of atomic broadcast need to make some synchrony assumptions or employ randomiza-
tion [21]. A very weak timing assumption that is also available in many practical implementations is an
eventual leader-detector oracle [13, 24].
We define an eventual leader-detector primitive, denoted Ω, for a system with Byzantine processes.
It informs the processes about one correct process that can serve as a leader, so that the protocol can
progress. When faults are limited to crashes, such a leader detector can be implemented from a failure
detector [13], a primitive that, in practice, exploits timeouts and low-level point-to-point messages to
determine whether a remote process is alive or has crashed.
With processes acting in arbitrary ways, though, one cannot rely on the timeliness of simple responses
for detecting Byzantine faults. One needs another way to determine remotely whether a process is faulty
or performs correctly as a leader. Detecting misbehavior in this model depends inherently on the specific
protocol being executed [18]. We use the approach of “trust, but verify,” where the processes monitor the
leader for correct behavior. More precisely, a leader is chosen arbitrarily, but ensuring a fair distribution
among all processes (in fact, it is only needed that a correct process is chosen at least with constant
probability on average, over all leader changes). Once elected, the chosen leader process gets a chance
to perform well. The other processes monitor its actions. Should the leader not have achieved the desired
goal after some time, they complain against it, and initiate a switch to a new leader.
Hence we assume that the leader should act according to the application and within some time
bounds. If the leader performs wrongly or exceeds the allocated time before reaching this goal, then
other processes detect this and report it as a failure to the leader detector by filing a complaint. In an
asynchronous system with eventual synchrony as considered here, every process always behaves accord-
ing to the specification and eventually all remote processes also observe this; if such correct behavior
cannot be observed from a process, then the process must be faulty.
This notion of “performance” depends on the specific algorithm executed by the processes, which
relies on the output from the leader-detection module. Therefore, eventual leader election with Byzantine
processes is not an isolated low-level abstraction, as with crash-stop processes, but requires some input
from the higher-level algorithm. The Ω-complain(p) event allows to express this. Every process may
complain against the current leader p by triggering this event.
Definition 3 (Byzantine leader detector). A Byzantine leader detector (Ω) is defined with these events:
Output event: Ω-trust(p): Indicates that process p is trusted to be leader.
Input event: Ω-complain(p): Expresses a complaint about the performance of leader process p.
The primitive satisfies the following properties:
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Eventual accuracy: There is a time after which every correct process trusts some correct process.
Eventual succession: If more than f correct processes that trust some process p complain about p, then
every correct process eventually trusts a different process than p.
Coup resistance: A correct process q does not trust a new leader unless at least one correct process has
complained against the leader which q trusted before.
Eventual agreement: There is a time after which no two correct processes trust different processes.
It is possible to lift the output from the Byzantine leader detector to an epoch-change primitive, which
outputs not only the identity of a leader but also an increasing epoch number. This abstraction divides
time into a series of epochs at every participating process, where epochs are identified by numbers. The
numbers of the epochs started by one particular process increase monotonically (but they do not have
to form a complete sequence). Moreover, the primitive also assigns a leader to every epoch, such that
any two correct processes in the same epoch receive the same leader. The mechanism for processes to
complain about the leader is the same as for Ω.
More precisely, epoch change is defined as follows [6]:
Definition 4 (Byzantine epoch-change). A Byzantine epoch-change (Ψ) primitive is defined with these
events:
Output event: Ψ-start-epoch (e, p): Indicates that the epoch with number e and leader p starts.
Input event: Ψ-complain(e, p): Expresses a complaint about the performance of leader process p.
The primitive satisfies the following properties:
Monotonicity: If a correct process starts an epoch (e, p) and later starts an epoch (e′, p′), then e′ > e.
Consistency: If a correct process starts an epoch (e, p) and another correct process starts an epoch
(e′, p′) with e = e′, then p = p′.
Eventual succession: Suppose more than f correct processes have started an epoch (e, p) as their last
epoch; when these processes all complain about p, then every correct process eventually starts an
epoch with a number higher than e.
Coup resistance: When a correct process that has most recently started some epoch (e1, p1) starts a new
epoch (e2, p2), then at least one correct process has complained about leader p1 in epoch e1.
Eventual leadership: There is a time after which every correct process has started some epoch and
starts no further epoch, such that the last epoch started at every correct process is epoch (e, p) and
process p is correct.
When an epoch-change abstraction is initialized, it is assumed that a default epoch with number 0
and a leader p0 has been started at all correct processes. The value of p0 is made available to all pro-
cesses implicitly. All “practical” BFT systems in the eventual-synchrony model starting from PBFT [11]
implicitly contain an implementation of Byzantine epoch-change; this notion was described explicitly by
Cachin et al. [6, Chap. 5].
2.4 Hash functions and digital signatures
We model cryptographic hash functions and digital signature schemes as ideal, deterministic functional-
ities implemented by a distributed oracle.
A cryptographic hash function maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a short, unique representation.
The functionality provides only a single operation hash ; its invocation takes a bit string x as parameter
and returns an integer h with the response. The implementation maintains a list L of all x that have
been queried so far. When the invocation contains x ∈ L, then hash responds with the index of x in L;
otherwise, hash appends x to L and returns its index. This ideal implementation models only collision
resistance but no other properties of real hash functions.
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The functionality of the digital signature scheme provides two operations, signp and verifyp. The
invocation of signp specifies a process p, takes a bit string m as input, and returns a signature σ ∈ {0, 1}∗
with the response. Only p may invoke signp. The operation verifyp takes a putative signature σ and a bit
string m as parameters and returns a Boolean value with the response. Its implementation satisfies that
verifyp(σ,m) returns TRUE for any process p and m ∈ {0, 1}∗ if and only if p has executed signp(m)
and obtained σ before; otherwise, verifyp(σ,m) returns FALSE. Every process may invoke verify. The
signature scheme may be implemented analogously to the hash function.
3 Modular protocol
In this section we discuss the modular execution of replicated non-deterministic programs. Here the
program is given as a black box, it cannot be changed, and the BFT system cannot access its internal data
structures. Very informally speaking, if some processes arrive at a different output during execution than
“most” others, then the output of the disagreeing processes is discarded. Instead they should “adopt”
the output of the others, e.g., by asking them for the agreed-on state and response. When the outputs of
“too many” processes disagree, the correct output may not be clear; the operation is then ignored (or,
as an optimization, quarantined as non-deterministic) and the state rolled back. In this modular solution
any application can be replicated without change; the application developers may not even be aware
of potential non-determinism. On the other hand, the modular protocol requires that most operations
are deterministic and produce almost always the same outputs at all processes; it would not work for
replicating probabilistic functions.
More precisely, a non-deterministic state machine may output different states and responses for the
same operation, which are due to probabilistic choices or other non-repeatable effects. Hence we assume
that execute is a relation and not a deterministic function, that is, repeated invocations of the same
operation with the same input may yield different outputs and responses. This means that the standard
approach of state-machine replication based directly on atomic broadcast fails.
There are two ways for modular black-box replication of non-deterministic applications in a BFT
system:
Order-then-execute: Applying the SMR principle directly, the operations are first ordered by atomic
broadcast. Whenever a process delivers an operation according to the total order, it executes the
operation. It does not output the response, however, before checking with enough others that they
all arrive at the same outputs. To this end, every process atomically broadcasts its outputs (or a
hash of the outputs) and waits for receiving a given number (up to n− f ) of outputs from distinct
processes. Then the process applies a fixed decision function to the atomically delivered outputs,
and it determines the successor state and the response.
This approach ensures consistency due to its conceptual simplicity but is not very efficient in
typical situations, where atomic broadcast forms the bottleneck. In particular, in atomic broadcast
with external validity, a process can only participate in the ordering of the next operation when it
has determined the outputs of the previous one. This eliminates potential gains from pipelining
and increases the overall latency.
Execute-then-order: Here the steps are inverted and the operations are executed speculatively before
the system commits their order. As in other practical protocols, this solution uses the heuristic
assumption that there is a designated leader which is usually correct. Thus, every process sends its
operations to the leader and the leader orders them. It asks all processes to execute the operations
speculatively in this order, the processes send (a hash of) their outputs to the leader, and the leader
determines a unique output. Note that this value is still speculative because the leader might fail or
there might be multiple leaders acting concurrently. The leader then tries to obtain a confirmation
of its speculative order by atomically broadcasting the chosen output. Once every process obtains
this output from atomic broadcast, it commits the speculative state and outputs the response.
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In rare cases when a leader is replaced, some processes may have speculated wrongly and executed
other operations than those determined through atomic broadcast. Due to non-determinism in the
execution a process may also have obtained a different speculative state and response than what the
leader has obtained and broadcast. This implies that the leader must either send the state (or state
delta) and the response resulting from the operation though atomic broadcast, or that a process has
a different way to recover the decided state from other processes.
In the following we describe Protocol Sieve, which adopts the approach of execute-then-order with
speculative execution.
3.1 Protocol Sieve
Protocol Sieve runs a Byzantine atomic broadcast with weak external validity (abv) and uses a sieve-
leader to coordinate the execution of non-deterministic operations. The leader is elected through a
Byzantine epoch-change abstraction, as defined in Section 2.3, which outputs epoch/leader tuples with
monotonically increasing epoch numbers. For the Sieve protocol these epochs are called configurations,
and Sieve progresses through a series of them, each with its own sieve-leader.
The processes send all operations to the service through the leader of the current configuration,
using an INVOKE message. The current leader then initiates that all processes execute the operation
speculatively; subsequently the processes agree on an output from the operation and thereby commit the
operation. As described here, Sieve executes one operation at a time, although it is possible to greatly
increase the throughput using the standard method of batching multiple operations together.
The leader sends an EXECUTE message to all processes with the operation o. In turn, every process
executes o speculatively on its current state s, obtains the speculative next state t and the speculative
response r, signs those values, and sends a hash and the signature back to the leader in an APPROVE
message.
The leader receives 2f + 1 APPROVE messages from distinct processes. If the leader observes at
least f + 1 approvals for the same speculative output, then it confirms the operation and proceeds to
committing and executing it. Otherwise, the leader concludes that the operation is aborted because of
diverging outputs. There must be f + 1 equal outputs for confirming o, in order to ensure that every
process will eventually learn the correct output, see below.
The leader then abv-broadcasts an ORDER message, containing the operation, the speculative output
(t, r) for a confirmed operation or an indication that it aborted, and for validation the set of APPROVE
messages that justify the decision whether to confirm or abort. During atomic broadcast, the external
validity check by the processes will verify this justification.
As soon as an ORDER message with operation o is abv-delivered to a process in Sieve, o is committed.
If o is confirmed, the process adopts the output decided by the leader. Note this may differ from the
speculative output computed by the process. Protocol Sieve therefore includes the next state t and the
response r in the ORDER message. In practice, however, one might not send t, but state deltas, or even
only the hash value of t while relying on a different way to recover the confirmed state. Indeed, since
f + 1 processes have approved any confirmed output, a process with a wrong speculative output is sure
to reach at least one of them for obtaining the confirmed output later.
In case the leader abv-broadcasted an ORDER message with the decision to abort the current oper-
ation because of the diverging outputs (i.e., no f + 1 identical hashes in 2f + 1 APPROVE messages),
the process simply ignores the current request and speculative state. As an optimization, processes may
quarantine the current request and flag it as non-deterministic.
As described so far, the protocol is open to a denial-of-service attack by multiple faulty processes
disguising as sieve-leaders and executing different operations. Note that the epoch-change abstraction,
in periods of asynchrony, will not ensure that any two correct processes agree on the leader, as some
processes might skip configurations. Therefore Sieve also orders the configuration and leader changes
using consensus (with the abv primitive).
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Algorithm 1 Protocol Sieve: replicated state machine with non-deterministic operations
State
I: set of invoked operations at every process B[p], for p ∈ P : buffer at sieve-leader
config: sieve-config number leader: sieve-leader, initially p0
next-epoch: announced sieve-config number, initially ⊥ next-leader: announced sieve-leader, initially ⊥
s: current state, initially s0 cur: current operation, initially ⊥
t: speculative state, initially ⊥ r: speculative response, initially ⊥
upon invocation rsm-execute(o) do
I ← I ∪ {o}
send message [INVOKE, config, o] over point-to-point link to leader
upon receiving message [INVOKE, c, o] from p such that B[p] = ⊥ and c = config and leader = self do
B[p]← o // buffer only the latest operation from each process
upon exists p that B[p] 6= ⊥ such that cur = ⊥ and leader = self do
cur ← B[p]
send [EXECUTE, config, cur] over point-to-point links to all processes
upon receiving message [EXECUTE, c, o] from process p such that p = leader and c = config and t = ⊥ do
(t, r)← execute(s, o)
σ ← signself(SPECULATE‖config‖hash(t‖r))
send message [APPROVE, config, o, hash(t‖r), σ] to leader
upon receiving 2f + 1 messages [APPROVE, cp, op, hp, σp], each from a distinct process p, such that
cp = config and opp = cur and verifyp(σp, SPECULATE‖config‖hp) and leader = self do
if there is a set E of f + 1 received APPROVE messages whose hp value is equal to hash(t‖r) then
abv-broadcast([ORDER, CONFIRM, config, cur, t, r, E ])
else
let U be the set of 2f + 1 received APPROVE messages
abv-broadcast([ORDER, ABORT, config, cur,⊥,⊥,U ])
upon event abv-deliver(p, [ORDER, decision, c, o, tc, rc, ·]) such that c = config do // commit o
if leader = self then
B[p]← ⊥
cur ← ⊥
if o ∈ I then
I ← I \ {o}
if decision = CONFIRM then
s← tc // adopt the agreed-on state and response, needed if (tc, rc) 6= (t, r)
rsm-output(o, s, rc)
t← ⊥
upon event Ψ-start-epoch (e, p) do
(next-epoch, next-leader)← (e, p)
if p = self ∧ e > config then
abv-broadcast([NEW-SIEVE-CONFIG, e, self])
upon event abv-deliver(p, [NEW-SIEVE-CONFIG, c, p]) do
(config, leader)← (c, p)
t← ⊥
periodically do
for every operation o ∈ I, determine the age of o since it has been invoked and added to I
if there are “old” operations in I then
Ψ-complain(leader)
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Algorithm 2 Validation predicate V () for Byzantine atomic broadcast used inside Algorithm Sieve
upon invocation V (m) do
if m = [ORDER, DECISION, c, o,M] then
if M is a set of f + 1 messages of the form [APPROVE, cp, op, hp, σp] such that
cp = config and op = o and verifyp(σp, SPECULATE‖cp‖hp) = TRUE and
all hp values in M are equal then
return TRUE
else if m = [ORDER, ABORT, c, o,M] then
if M is a set of 2f + 1 messages of the form [APPROVE, cp, op, hp, σp] such that
cp = config and op = o and verifyp(σp, SPECULATE‖cp‖hp) = TRUE and
no f + 1 of the hp values in M are equal then
return TRUE
else if m = [NEW-SIEVE-CONFIG, c, p] then
if c ≤ next-epoch and p = next-leader then
return TRUE
return FALSE
To this effect, whenever a process receives a start-epoch event with itself as leader, the process abv-
broadcasts a NEW-SIEVE-CONFIG message, announcing itself as the leader. The validation predicate for
broadcast verifies that the leader announcement concerns a configuration that is not newer than the most
recently started epoch at the validating process, and that the process itself endorses the same next leader.
Every process then starts the new configuration when the NEW-SIEVE-CONFIG message is abv-delivered.
If there was a speculatively executed operation, it is aborted and its output discarded.
The design of Sieve prevents uncoordinated speculative request execution, which may cause con-
tention among requests from different self-proclaimed leaders and can prevent liveness easily. Naturally,
a faulty leader may also violate liveness, but this is not different from other leader-based BFT protocols.
The details of Protocol Sieve are shown in Algorithms 1–2. The pseudocode assumes that all point-
to-point messages among correct processes are authenticated, cannot be forged or altered, and respect
FIFO order. The invoked operations are unique across all processes and self denotes the identifier of the
executing process.
3.2 Correctness
Theorem 1. Protocol Sieve implements a replicated state machine allowing a non-deterministic func-
tionality execute(), except that demonstrably non-deterministic operations may be filtered out and not
executed.
Proof sketch. The agreement condition of Definition 2 follows directly from the protocol and from the
abv primitive. Every rsm-output event is immediately preceded by an abv-delivered ORDER message,
which is the same for all correct processes due to agreement of abv. Since all correct processes react to
it deterministically, their outputs are the same.
For the correctness property, note that the outputs (si, ri) (state and response) resulting from an
operation o must have been confirmed by the protocol and therefore the values were included in an
APPROVE message from at least one correct process. This process computed the values such that they
satisfy (si, ri) = execute(si−1, o) according to the protocol for handling an EXECUTE message. On
the other hand, no correct process outputs anything for committed operations that were aborted, this is
permitted by the exception in the theorem statement. Moreover, only operations are filtered out for which
distinct correct processes computed diverging outputs, as ensured by the sieve-leader when it determines
whether the operation is confirmed or aborted. In order to abort, no set of f + 1 processes must have
computed the same outputs among the 2f +1 processes sending the APPROVE messages. Hence, at least
two among every set of f + 1 correct processes arrived at diverging outputs.
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Termination is only required for deterministic operations, they must terminate despite faulty pro-
cesses that approve wrong outputs. The protocol ensures this through the condition that at least f + 1
among the 2f + 1 APPROVE messages received by the sieve-leader are equal. The faulty processes, of
which there are at most f , cannot cause an abort through this. But every ORDER message is eventually
abv-delivered and every confirmed operation is eventually executed and generates an output.
3.3 Optimizations
Rollback and state transfer. In Protocol Sieve every process maintains a copy of the application state
resulting from an operation until the operation is committed. Moreover, the confirmed state and the
response of an operation are included in ORDER messages that are abv-broadcast. For practical applica-
tions though, this is often too expensive, and another way for recovering the application state is needed.
The solution is to roll back an operation and to transfer the correct state from other processes.
We assume that there exists a rollback primitive, ensuring that for (t, r) ← execute(s, o), the output
of rollback(t, r, o) is always s. In the ORDER messages of the protocol, the resulting output state and
response are replaced by their hashes for checking the consistency among the processes. Thus, when a
process receives an ORDER message with a confirmed operation and hashes ht and hr of the output state
and response, respectively, it checks whether the speculative state and response satisfy hash(t) = ht and
hash(r) = hr. If so, it proceeds as in the protocol.
If the committed operation was aborted, or the values do not match in a confirmed operation, the
process rolls back the operation. For a confirmed operation, the process then invokes state transfer and
retrieves the correct state t and response r that match the hashes from other clients. It will then set the
state variable s to t and output the response r. Rollback helps to implement transfer state efficiently, by
sending incremental updates only.
For transferring the state, the process sends a STATE-REQUEST message to all those processes who
produced the SPECULATE-signatures contained in the f + 1 APPROVE messages, which the process
receives together with a committed and confirmed operation. Since at most f of them may fail to respond,
the process is guaranteed to receive the correct state.
State transfer is also initiated when a new configuration starts through an abv-delivered NEW-SIEVE-
CONFIG message, but the process has already speculatively executed an operation in the last configuration
without committing it (this can be recognized by t 6= ⊥). As in the above use of state transfer, the
operation must terminate before the process becomes ready to execute further operations from EXECUTE
messages.
Synchronization with PBFT-based atomic broadcast. When the well-known PBFT protocol [11] is
used to implement abv-broadcast, two further optimizations are possible, mainly because PBFT also
relies on a leader and already includes Byzantine epoch-change. Hence assume that every process runs
PBFT according to Castro and Liskov [11, Sec. 4].
First, let an epoch-change event of Ψ occur at every view change of PBFT. More precisely, whenever
a process has received a correct PBFT-NEW-VIEW message for PBFT-view number v and new primary
process p, and when the matching VIEW-CHANGE messages have arrived, then the process triggers a
Ψ-start-epoch (v, p) event at Sieve. The process subsequently starts executing requests in the new view.
Moreover, complaints from Sieve are handled in the same way as when a backup in PBFT suspects the
current primary to be faulty, namely, it initiates a view change by sending a VIEW-CHANGE message.
The view change mechanism of PBFT ensures all properties expected from Ψ, as follows. The
monotonicity and consistency properties of Byzantine epoch-change follow directly from the calculation
of strictly increasing view numbers in PBFT and the deterministic derivation of the PBFT-primary from
the view. The eventual leadership condition follows from the underlying timing assumption, which es-
sentially means that timeouts are increased until, eventually, every correct process is able to communicate
with the leader, the leader is correct, and no further epoch-changes occur.
The second optimization concerns the NEW-SIEVE-CONFIG message. According to Sieve it is abv-
broadcast whenever a new sieve-leader is elected, by that leader. As the leader is directly mapped to
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PBFT’s primary here, it is now the primary who sends this message as a PBFT request. Note that this
request might not be delivered when the primary fails, but it will be delivered by the other processes
according to the properties of abv-broadcast, as required by Sieve. Hence, the new sieve-configuration
and sieve-leader are assigned either by all correct processes or by none of them.
With these two specializations for PBFT, Sieve incurs the additional cost of the EXECUTE/APPROVE
messages in the request flow, and one NEW-SIEVE-CONFIG following every view-change of PBFT. But
determining the sieve-leader and implementing Ψ do not lead to any additional messages.
3.4 Discussion
Non-deterministic operations have not often been discussed in the context of BFT systems. The literature
commonly assumes that deterministic behavior can be imposed on an application or postulates to change
the application code for isolating non-determinism. In practice, however, it is often not possible.
Liskov [29] sketches an approach to deal with non-determinism in PBFT which is similar to Sieve
in the sense that it treats the application code modularly and uses execute-then-order. This proposal
is restricted to the particular structure of PBFT, however, and does not consider the notion of external
validity for abv broadcast.
For applications on multi-core servers, the Eve system [27] also executes operation groups specu-
latively across processes and detects diverging states during a subsequent verification stage. In case of
divergence, the processes must roll back the operations. The approach taken in Eve resembles that of
Sieve, but there are notable differences. Specifically, the primary application of Eve continues to assume
deterministic operations, and non-determinism may only result from concurrency during parallel execu-
tion of requests. Furthermore, this work uses a particular agreement protocol based on PBFT and not a
generic abv broadcast primitive.
It should be noted that Sieve not only works with Byzantine atomic broadcast in the model of eventual
synchrony, but can equally well be run over randomized Byzantine consensus [7, 33].
4 Master-slave protocol
By adopting the master-slave model one can support a broader range of non-deterministic application
behavior compared to the modular protocol. This design generally requires source-code access and mod-
ifications to the program implementing the functionality. In a master-slave protocol for non-deterministic
execution, one process is designated as master. The master executes every operation first and records
all non-deterministic choices. All other processes act as slaves and follow the same choices. To cope
with a potentially Byzantine master, the slaves must be given means to verify that the choices made
by the master are plausible. The master-slave solution presented here follows primary-backup replica-
tion [3], which is well-known to handle non-deterministic operations. For instance, if the application
accesses a pseudorandom number generator, only the master obtains the random bits from the generator
and the slaves adopt the bits chosen by the master. This protocol does not work for functionalities involv-
ing cryptography, however, where master-slave replication typically falls short of achieving the desired
goals. Instead a cryptographically secure protocol should be used; they are the subject of Section 5.
4.1 Non-deterministic execution with evidence
As introduced in Section 3, the execute operation of a non-deterministic state machine is a relation.
Different output values are possible and represent acceptable outcomes. We augment the output of an
operation execution by adding evidence for justifying the resulting state and response. The slave pro-
cesses may then replay the choices of the master and accept its output.
More formally, we now extend execute to nondet-execute as follows:
nondet-execute(s, o) → (s′, r, ρ).
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Its parameters s, o, s′, and r are the same as for execute; additionally, the function also outputs evi-
dence ρ. Evidence enables the slave processes to execute the operation by themselves and obtain the
same output as the master, or perhaps only to validate the output generated by another execution. For
this task there is a function
verify-execution(s, o, s′, r, ρ) → {FALSE, TRUE}
that outputs TRUE if and only if the set of possible outputs from nondet-execute(s, o) contains (s′, r, ρ).
For completeness we require that for every s and o, when (s′, r, ρ) ← nondet-execute(s, o), it always
holds verify-execute(s, o, s′, r, e) = TRUE.
As a basic verification method, a slave could rerun the computation of the master. Extensions to use
cryptographic verifiable computation [41] are possible. Note that we consider randomized algorithms to
be a special case of non-deterministic ones. The evidence for executing a randomized algorithm might
simply consist of the random coin flips made during the execution.
4.2 Replication protocol
Implementing a replicated state machine with non-deterministic operations using master-slave replication
does not require an extra round of messages to be exchanged, as in Protocol Sieve. It suffices that the
master is chosen by a Byzantine epoch-change abstraction and that the master broadcasts every operation
together with the corresponding evidence.
More precisely, the processes operate on top of an underlying broadcast primitive abv and a Byzan-
tine epoch-change abstraction Ψ. Whenever a process receives a start-epoch event with itself as leader
from Ψ, the process considers itself to be the master for the epoch and abv-broadcasts a message that
announces itself as the master for the epoch. The epochs evolve analogously to the configurations in
Sieve, with the same mechanism to approve changes of the master in the validation predicate of atomic
broadcast. Similarly, non-master processes send their operations to the master of the current epoch for
ordering and execution.
For every invoked operation o, the master computes (s′, r, ρ) ← nondet-execute(s, o) and abv-
broadcasts an ORDER message containing the current epoch c and parameters o, s′, r, and ρ. The
validation predicate of atomic broadcast for ORDER messages verifies that the message concerns the cur-
rent epoch and that verify-execution(s, o, s′, r, ρ) = TRUE using the current state s of the process. Once
an ORDER message is abv-delivered, a process adopts the response and output state from the message as
its own.
As discussed in the first optimization for Sieve (Section 3.3), the output state s′ and response r do not
always have to be included in the ORDER messages. In the master-slave model, they can be replaced by
hashes only for those operations where the evidence ρ contains sufficient data for a process to compute
the same s′ and r values as the master. This holds, for example, when all non-deterministic choices of
an operation are contained in ρ.
Should the master abv-broadcast an operation with evidence that does not execute properly, i.e.,
verify-execution(s, o, s′, r, ρ) = FALSE, the atomic broadcast primitive ensures that it is not abv-delivered
through the external validity property. As in Sieve, every process periodically checks if the operations
that it has invoked have been executed and complains against the current master using Ψ. This ensures
that misbehaving masters are eventually replaced.
4.3 Discussion
The master-slave protocol is inspired by primary-backup replication [3], and for the concrete scenario
of a BFT system, it was first described by Castro, Rodrigues, and Liskov in BASE [12]. The protocol
of BASE addresses only the particular context of PBFT, however, and not a generic atomic broadcast
primitive.
As mentioned before, the master-slave protocol requires changes to the application for extracting
the evidence that will convince the slave processes that choices made by the master are valid. This
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works well in practice for applications in which only a few, known steps can lead to divergence. For
example, operations reading inputs from the local system, accessing platform-specific environment data,
or generating randomness can be replicated whenever those functions are provided by programming
libraries. Master-slave replication may only be employed when the application developer is aware of the
causes of non-determinism; for example, a multi-threaded application influenced by a non-deterministic
scheduler could not be replicated unless the developer can also control the scheduling (e.g., [26]).
5 Cryptographically secure protocols
Security functions implemented with cryptography are more important today than ever. Replicating an
application that involves a cryptographic secret, however, requires a careful consideration of the attack
model. If the BFT system should tolerate that f processes become faulty in arbitrary ways, it must be
assumed that their secrets leak to the adversary against whom the cryptographic scheme is employed.
Service-level secret keys must be protected and should never leak to an individual process. Two
solutions have been explored to address this issue. One could delegate this responsibility to a third party,
such as a centralized service or a secure hardware module at every process. However, this contradicts
the main motivation behind replication: to eliminate central control points. Alternatively one may use
distributed cryptography [17], share the keys among the processes so that no coalition of up to f among
them learns anything, and perform the cryptographic operations under distributed control. This model
was pioneered by Reiter and Birman [35] and exploited, for instance, by SINTRA [4, 9] or COCA [42].
In this section we discuss two methods for integrating non-deterministic cryptographic operations in a
BFT system. The first scheme is a novel protocol in the context of BFT systems, called Mastercrypt, and
uses verifiable random functions to generate pseudorandom bits. This randomness is unpredictable and
cannot be biased by a Byzantine process. The second scheme is the well-known technique of distributed
cryptography, as discussed above, which addresses a broad range of cryptographic applications. Both
schemes adopt the master-slave replication protocol from the previous section.
5.1 Randomness from verifiable random functions
A verifiable random function (VRF) [32] resembles a pseudorandom function but additionally permits
anyone to verify non-interactively that the choice of random bits occurred correctly. The function there-
fore guarantees correctness for its output without disclosing anything about the secret seed, in a way
similar to non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of correctness.
More precisely, the process owning the VRF chooses a secret seed sk and publishes a public verifi-
cation key vk. Then the function family Gsk : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}µ and algorithms Psk and Vpk are a VRF
whenever three properties hold:
Correctness: y ← Gsk(x) can be computed efficiently from sk and for every x one can also (with the
help of sk) efficiently generate a proof pi ← Psk(x) such that Vpk(x, y, pi) = TRUE.
Uniqueness: For every input x there is a unique y that satisfies Vpk(x, y, pi), i.e., it is impossible to find
y0 and y1 6= y0 and pi0 and pi1 such that Vpk(x, y0, pi0) = Vpk(x, y1, pi1) = TRUE.
Pseudorandomness: From knowing vk alone and sampling values from Vsk and Psk, no polynomial-
time adversary can distinguish the output of Gsk(x) from a uniformly random µ-bit string, unless
the adversary calls the owner to evaluate Vsk or Psk on x.
Thus, a VRF generates a value for every input x which is unpredictable and pseudorandom to anyone
not knowing sk. As Gsk(x) is unique for a given x, even an adversarially chosen key preserves the
pseudorandomness of G’s outputs towards other processes.
Efficient implementations of VRFs have not been easy to find, but the literature nowadays contains a
number of reasonable constructions under broadly accepted hardness assumptions [30, 25]. In practice,
when adopting the random-oracle model, VRFs can immediately be obtained from unique signatures
such as ordinary RSA signatures [30].
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Replication with cryptographic randomness from a VRF. With master-slave replication, crypto-
graphically strong randomness secure against faulty non-leader processes can be obtained from a VRF
as follows. Initially every process generates a VRF-seed and a verification key. Then it passes the ver-
ification key to a trusted entity, which distributes the n verification keys to all processes consistently,
ensuring that all correct processes use the same list of verification keys. At every place where the ap-
plication needs to generate (pseudo-)randomness, the VRF is used by the master to produce the random
bits and all processes verify that the bits are unique.
In more detail, Mastercrypt works as follows. The master computes all random choices while execut-
ing an operation o as r ← Gsk(tag), where tag denotes a unique identifier for the instance and operation.
This tag must never reused by the protocol and should not be under the control of the master. The master
supplies pi ← Psk(tag) to the other processes as evidence for the choice of r. During the verification
step in verify-execution() every process now validates that Vpk(tag, r, pi) = TRUE. When executing the
operation, every process uses the same randomness r.
The pseudorandomness property of the VRF ensures that no process apart from the master (or anyone
knowing its secret seed) can distinguish r from truly random bits. This depends crucially on the condition
that tag is used only once as input to the VRF. Hence this solution yields a deterministic pseudorandom
output that achieves the desired unpredictability and randomness in many cases, especially against en-
tities that are not part of the BFT system. Note that simply handing over the seed of a cryptographic
pseudorandom generator to all processes and treating the generator as part of a deterministic application
would be predictable for the slave processes and not pseudorandom.
Of course, if the master is faulty then it can predict the value of r, leak it to other processes, and
influence the protocol accordingly. The protocol should leave as little as possible choice to the master
for influencing the value of tag. It could be derived from an identifier of the protocol or BFT system
“instance,” perhaps including the identities of all processes, followed by a uniquely determined binary
representation of the operation’s sequence number. If one assumes all operations are represented by
unique bit strings, a hash of the operation itself could also serve as identifier.
5.2 Using distributed cryptography
Distributed cryptography or, more precisely, threshold cryptography [17] distributes the power of a cryp-
tosystem among a group of n processes such that it tolerates f faulty ones, which may leak their secrets,
fail to participate in protocols, or even act adversarially against the other processes. Threshold cryptosys-
tems extend cryptographic secret sharing schemes, which permit the process group to maintain a secret
such that f or fewer of them have no information about it, but any set of more than f can reconstruct it.
A threshold public-key cryptosystem (T-PKCS), for example, is a public-key cryptosystem with dis-
tributed control over the decryption operation. There is a single public key for encryption, but each
process holds a key share for decryption. When a ciphertext is to be decrypted, every process computes
a decryption share from the ciphertext and its key share. From any f + 1 of these decryption shares, the
plaintext can be recovered. Usually the decryption shares are accompanied by zero-knowledge proofs to
make the scheme robust. This models a non-interactive T-PKCS, which is practical because it only needs
one round of point-to-point messages for exchanging the decryption shares; other T-PKCSs require inter-
action among the processes for computing shares. The public key and the key shares are generated either
by a trusted entity before the protocol starts or again in a distributed way, tolerating faulty processes that
may try to disrupt the key-generation protocol [22].
A state-of-the-art T-PKCS is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks [38], ensuring that an
adversary cannot obtain any meaningful information from a ciphertext unless at least one correct process
has computed a decryption share. With a T-PKCS the BFT system can receive operations in encrypted
form, order them first without knowing their content, and only decrypt and execute them after they have
been ordered. This approach defends against violations of the causal order among operations [35, 7].
A threshold signature scheme works analogously and can be used, for instance, to implement a se-
cure name service or a certification authority [4, 42, 10]. Practical non-interactive threshold signature
schemes are well-known [37]. To generate cryptographically strong and unpredictable pseudorandom
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bits, threshold coin-tossing schemes have also been constructed [8]. They do not suffer from the limi-
tation of the VRF construction in the previous section and ensure that no single process can predict the
randomness until at least one correct process has agreed to start the protocol.
Replication with threshold cryptosystems. Threshold cryptosystems have been used in BFT repli-
cation starting with the work Reiter and Birman [35]. Subsequently SINTRA [9] and other systems
exploited it as well with robust, asynchronous protocols.
For integrating a threshold cryptosystems with a BFT system, no particular assumptions are needed
about the structure of the atomic broadcast or even the existence of a leader. The distributed scheme can
simply be inserted into the code that executes operations and directly replaces the calls to the cryptosys-
tems.
To be more precise, suppose that execute(s, o) invokes a call to one of the three cryptosystem func-
tions discussed before (that is, public-key decryption, issuing a digital signature, or generating random
bits). The process now invokes the threshold algorithm to generate a corresponding share. If the thresh-
old cryptosystem is non-interactive, the process sends this share to all others over the point-to-point links.
Then the process waits for receiving f + 1 shares and assembles them to the result of the cryptographic
operation. With interactive threshold schemes, the processes invoke the corresponding protocol as a
subroutine. Ideally the threshold cryptosystem supports the same cryptographic signature structure or
ciphertext format as the standardized schemes; then the rest of the service (i.e., code of the clients) can
remain the same as with a centralized service. This holds for RSA signatures, for instance [10].
6 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a distinction between three models for dealing with non-deterministic opera-
tions in BFT replication: modular where the application is a black box; master-slave that needs internal
access to the application; and cryptographically secure handling of non-deterministic randomness gener-
ation. In the past, dedicated BFT replication systems have often argued for using the master-slave model,
but we have learned in the context of blockchain applications that changes of the code and understanding
an application’s logic can be difficult. Hence, our novel Protocol Sieve provides a modular solution that
does not require any manual intervention. For a BFT-based blockchain platform, Sieve can simply be run
without incurring large overhead as a defense against non-determinism, which may be hidden in smart
contracts.
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